Notre Dame Law Review Online
Volume 94 | Issue 2

Article 1

2018

Nondiscrimination in 5G Standards
Eli Greenbaum
Yigal Arnon & Co.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr_online
Part of the Communications Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons
Recommended Citation
94 Notre Dame L. Rev. Online 55 (2018).

This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Law Review at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre
Dame Law Review Online by an authorized editor of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

ESSAYS

NONDISCRIMINATION IN 5G STANDARDS
Eli Greenbaum*
INTRODUCTION
Nondiscrimination has been the neglected stepchild of the FRAND
commitment. Patent owners participating in standards organizations typically
commit to license their technology on “fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory
(“FRAND”) terms.”1 While a number of cases have provided extensive
consideration of the first “fair and reasonable” part of FRAND, until recently, U.S.
decisions provided only meager analysis of the second “non-discrimination”
prong.2 The recent TCL decision3 in the United States and the Unwired Planet
decision4 in the United Kingdom provide significant new guidance concerning the
FRAND nondiscrimination requirement. Unfortunately, advancing 5G technology
will bring new difficulties in applying that requirement, and neither decision will
assist in addressing these coming complexities.
5G refers to the soon-to-be-deployed5 fifth generation of mobile networking
standards. Earlier versions—from 1G to 4G—moved cellular communications
from their analog beginnings to our current sophisticated digital data transmission

© 2018 Eli Greenbaum. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Essay in any format, at or below cost, for educational purposes, so long as
each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review Online, and
includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Partner, Yigal Arnon & Co., Jerusalem, Israel; J.D., Yale Law School; M.S., Columbia
University.
1 See FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 17-CV-00220, 2017 WL 2774406, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June
26, 2017).
2 TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, No. SACV
14-341, 2017 WL 6611635, at *55 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017) (“No American cases have
definitively addressed the non-discrimination requirement.”).
3 Id.
4 Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co., [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711 (Eng.), aff’d,
[2018] EWCA (Civ) 2344.
5 Industry groups completed a substantial part of the 5G specifications in June 2018. See
Rel-15 Success Spans 3GPP Groups, 3GPP (June 14, 2018), http://www.3gpp.org/newsevents/3gpp-news/1965-rel-15_news.
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networks.6 5G promises faster speeds, more stability, and lower latency when
compared to existing 4G networks. In addition, while previous generations
focused on communications between individuals, 5G technology is expected to
also support new use cases, including networking between devices with embedded
sensors.7 5G networks, for example, are expected to facilitate close-to-sciencefiction technologies such as autonomous vehicle communications, smart grid (e.g.,
electricity and water distribution) networks, and remote surgery. 8
The broad diffusion of 5G technology, and its incorporation into a hefty
catalog of devices and machines, will put more pressure on the nondiscrimination
prong of the FRAND commitment. The value of 5G technology to simple
consumer electronics (such as home routers) will differ starkly from the value of
the same technology to cutting edge equipment (such as for remote surgery). Does
a nondiscrimination commitment allow patentees to charge differential royalties
for 5G technology in such diverse use cases? Both TCL and Unwired Planet
examined the requirements of nondiscrimination only as between companies
providing similar products. Going forward, however, judicial and regulatory
interpretation of the nondiscrimination requirement in the 5G context will require
potentially controversial application of the FRAND commitment across different
technological applications. In addition, 5G nondiscrimination debates will strain
arrangements within standard organizations themselves. Neither TCL nor Unwired
Planet provide guidance for these impending disputes.
I.

NONDISCRIMINATION

Our information age relies on standardization. Perhaps most prominently,
existing telecommunications networks require standardization to allow a diverse
range of cellular devices to communicate and exchange data. The standardization
process, while providing undisputed benefits, also presents well-analyzed problems
for industry competition.9 Participants in standards development can try to move
standards toward their own patented technology and then extract unreasonably
high rents for use of that technology. 10 As a result, standards organizations

6 For a brief history of telecommunications standards, see Qualcomm, 2017 WL 2774406,
at *1–3.
7 BILJANA BADIC ET AL., ROLLING OUT 5G: USE CASES, APPLICATIONS, AND
TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS 40–41 (2016) (“[5G’s] dramatic number of new use cases . . . present
challenges for the entire industrial landscape. While a small number of major smartphone
manufacturers currently supply the market . . . 5G is expected to shift productization to a large
number of smaller players for addressing specific niche markets.”).
8 See, e.g., Bijan Khosravi, Autonomous Cars Won’t Work—Until We Have 5G, FORBES
(Mar. 25, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bijankhosravi/2018/03/25/autonomous-cars-wontwork-until-we-have-5g/#38de0bc9437e; Katy Scott, How 5G Could Change Everything From
Music
to
Medicine,
CNN
(Feb.
5,
2018),
https://money.cnn.com/2018/02/05/technology/business/5g-internet-of-skills/index.html;
Jay
Stanley, The State of 5G: When It’s Coming, How Fast It Will Be & The Sci-Fi Future It Will
Enable, TECHSPOT (Feb. 25, 2018), https://www.techspot.com/article/1582-state-of-5g-wireless/.
9 See, e.g., Joseph Farrell et al., Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST
L.J. 603, 616–18 (2007).
10 See, e.g., Qualcomm, 2017 WL 2774406, at *2.
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typically require participants to license standard-essential patents (“SEPs”) under
FRAND terms.11 This licensing commitment is intended to assure implementers
that proprietary technology in standards will be available on reasonable terms
while simultaneously assuring innovators that they will receive reasonable returns
on their investments.12 Unfortunately, FRAND commitments typically provide
only indistinct principles rather than clear criteria for setting royalty rates.
Disputes over the meaning of FRAND have required courts to establish
frameworks for negotiation and to calculate specific royalty amounts.
Uncertainty over the nondiscrimination prong of the FRAND commitment
has been especially pronounced, and that ambiguity has lingered in the absence of
court decisions definitively addressing the requirement. 13 Economic analysis of
the FRAND commitment—as with economic analysis generally—has often
supported the right of patentees to price discriminate between different end uses of
the technology. For example, in their influential analysis, Dennis Carlton and
Allan Shampine assert that FRAND prohibits only discrimination between firms
that “expect to obtain the same incremental value from the patented technology.”14
According to this position, differential royalties could be charged to firms
producing diverse products that do not compete with each other—for example,
patentees could price discriminate between handset manufacturers and wireless
heart monitors. Other economists have similarly suggested that FRAND
nondiscrimination would permit royalties that vary “depending on each player’s
bargaining power or business features,” 15 or price differentials that do not have
“anticompetitive effects.”16
Notwithstanding theoretical academic analyses, firms have already fought the
first skirmishes to define the 5G interpretation of nondiscrimination. In May 2017,
the European Commission announced that it would issue guidance for the
11 Farrell et al., supra note 9, at 609.
12 See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable
Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J., 1135, 1137 (2013).
13 J. Gregory Sidak, Fair and Unfair Discrimination in Royalties for Standard-Essential
Patents Encumbered by a FRAND or RAND Commitment, 2 CRITERION J. ON INNOVATION 301,
307–08 (2017) (“[C]ourts have largely ignored the nondiscrimination requirement’s existence and
consequently have offered little guidance as to its meaning.”).
14 Dennis W. Carlton & Allan L. Shampine, An Economic Interpretation of FRAND, 9 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 531, 546 (2013); see also Daniel G. Swanson & William J. Baumol,
Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory (RAND) Royalties, Standards Selection, and Control of
Market Power, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 35 (2005) (asserting that nondiscriminatory pricing requires
that the royalty rate differ “precisely by the amount that the corresponding final product prices
vary”). But see Richard J. Gilbert, Deal or No Deal? Licensing Negotiations in Standard-Setting
Organizations, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 855, 872–73 (2011) (requiring patentees to offer the same
schedule of licensing terms to every potential licensee). Permitting differential royalties may also
be supported by caselaw. See Jorge L. Contreras, A Brief History of FRAND: Analyzing Current
Debates in Standard Setting and Antitrust Through a Historical Lens, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 39, 80
(2015) (opining that historical caselaw supports “differential pricing between different
distribution channels or categories of licensees”).
15 Mario Mariniello, Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) Terms: A
Challenge for Competition Authorities, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 523, 532 (2011).
16 Anne Layne-Farrar, Nondiscriminatory Pricing: Is Standard Setting Different?, 6 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 811, 832 (2010) (emphasis omitted).
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valuation of standard technology.17 One of the purposes of the initiative was to
“provide a level playing field to businesses preparing 5G and those using
connectivity applications.”18 The Fair Standards Alliance, an industry organization
which includes large technology companies such as Apple, Google, and Intel
among its members,19 responded to the initiative by asserting that allowing usebased royalty discrimination “could harm the European economy at a critical time
for development and proliferation of [Internet of Things] and 5G technologies” 20
since it would allow patentees to “seek compensation for unpatented technologies
or technologies that the patent holder did not invent or create.” 21 Opponents of this
position responded with press releases and articles arguing that a prohibition on
use-based licensing would stifle innovation. 22 The Commission eventually issued
guidance that did not address the issue, declining to take sides between the warring
sides.23
II.

TCL AND UNWIRED PLANET

TCL Communication Technology Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM
Ericsson24 and Unwired Planet International Ltd. v. Huawei Technologies Co. 25
were the first court decisions in the United States and United Kingdom,
respectively, to directly address discrimination between similarly situated firms.
Commentators hailed the decisions as providing “crucial guidance,” 26 “helpful
insights,”27 and “important guideposts”28 in assessing FRAND obligations.
Unfortunately, however, these decisions addressed only relatively straightforward
questions of nondiscrimination. Both cases examined differential royalties

17 Standard Essential Patents for a European Digitalised Economy, at 2, European
Comm’n (Oct. 4, 2017), https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/initiatives/ares-20171906931_en.
18 Id. at 3.
19 About Us, FAIR STANDARDS ALL., http://www.fair-standards.org/about-us/ (last visited
Oct. 10, 2018).
20 European Commission Roadmap: Standard Essential Patents for a European Digitalised
Economy Feedback, at 3 (May 8, 2017), https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/betterregulation/initiatives/ares-2017-1906931/feedback/F1743_en?p_id=20114.
21 Id.
22 See, e.g., Who Is Going to Win the Big EU Commission SEP Licensing Battle—“UseBased” or “Licence to All”?, IPKAT (Nov. 9, 2017), http://ipkitten.blogspot.co.il/2017/11/whois-going-to-win-big-eu-commission.html.
23 Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the
European Economic and Social Committee—Setting Out the EU Approach to Standard Essential
Patents
(Nov.
29,
2017),
https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/26583/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/native.
24 No. SACV 14-341, 2017 WL 6611635 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017).
25 [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711 (Eng.).
26 Sophie Lawrance & Francion Brooks, Unwired Planet v Huawei: The First UK FRAND
Determination, 9 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 170, 170 (2018).
27 Sidak, supra note 13, at 307.
28 See Jorge L. Contreras, TCL v. Ericsson: The First Major U.S. Top-Down FRAND
Royalty Decision, PATENTLY-O (Dec 27, 2017), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/12/contrerasericsson-decision.html.
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between handset providers, one of the most common use cases of current wireless
communication standards.29
Neither case, however, addressed the more
controversial question to be presented by the broad implementation of 5G
technology—discrimination between licensees receiving different incremental
value from the technology.
TCL examined when cellular handset manufacturers should be considered
“similarly situated”30 for purposes of applying the nondiscrimination requirement.
Ericsson held a large portfolio of patents covering several generations of cellular
communications technology.31 Ericsson had pledged that these patents would be
made available to companies under FRAND terms. 32 TCL, a Chinese handset
manufacturer, spent several years negotiating the terms of a license to those patents
with Ericsson, but the parties were unable to come to an agreement.33 In 2014,
TCL asserted in court that Ericsson had failed to abide by its FRAND
commitments.34
In December 2017, the court issued a detailed opinion calculating the
FRAND rates applicable to TCL’s use of the Ericsson patent portfolio. The
decision provided extensive analysis of the nondiscrimination prong of FRAND. 35
Ericsson had argued that the largest handset manufacturers—specifically Samsung
and Apple—were not “similarly situated” to TCL and, as such, Ericsson could
discriminate against TCL by charging it higher royalty rates than those flagship
brands.36 The court rejected that argument and held that “the prohibition on
discrimination would mean very little if the largest, most profitable firms could
always be a category unto themselves simply because they were the largest and
most profitable firms.”37 In other words, the court held that high and low end
vendors of the same product should be considered similarly situated—and
patentees could not discriminate between such firms by offering them different
royalty rates. According to the court, the “most important factor in determining
which firms are similarly situated”38 is the geographic scope of the license, rather
than sales volume, profitability, or brand recognition of the licensee.39
Broadly speaking, Unwired Planet addressed the same nondiscrimination
questions raised in TCL, even as the United Kingdom court came to some different
conclusions. Unwired Planet, a nonpracticing entity, commenced proceedings in

29 TCL, 2017 WL 6611635, at *3; Unwired Planet, [2017] EWHC at [66]. Unwired Planet
also examined discrimination in royalties for “RAN infrastructure”—base stations through which
mobile devices could access the network. Unwired Planet, [2017] EWHC at [488].
30 TCL, 2017 WL 6611635, at *29.
31 Id. at *1.
32 Id.
33 Id. at *1–3.
34 Id. at *3.
35 Id. at *29–35.
36 See id. at *29.
37 Id. at *33.
38 Id. at *32. TCL did hold that a patentee could discriminate between global firms and
companies that sold into only a single market. Id.
39 Id. at *33.
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2014 against a number of handset manufacturers. 40 Unwired Planet alleged that
those firms infringed patents covering wireless telecommunication standards that
Unwired Planet had purchased from Ericsson.41 As in TCL, the patent portfolio
had earlier been committed under FRAND terms.42 The court, in a long and
detailed opinion, calculated applicable FRAND royalties for the purchased
patents.43
As in TCL, the central nondiscrimination issue was whether the patentee
could discriminate between manufacturers based on their respective size or market
share.44 As in TCL, Unwired Planet also held that a patentee could not
discriminate between licensees based on their size. 45 Specifically, the Unwired
Planet court asserted that a FRAND rate must be based on a benchmark value of
the licensed patents—a patentee could not discriminate between licensees based on
their size or other characteristics specific to the licensee. 46 In this respect, the court
stated that “new entrants are entitled to pay a royalty based on the same benchmark
as established large entities.”47
Both TCL and Unwired Planet provide insights for the application of the
FRAND nondiscrimination commitment. However, neither case addresses the
pressing issues to be raised by the large-scale adoption of 5G technology. That
technology will see wireless communication technology included in a diverse
collection of products and services—from now-commoditized cellphones to
leading-edge innovations. Courts will need to pass judgment on whether patentees
can price discriminate between such products, capturing greater value from the
more expensive, sophisticated products and services while allowing the commodity
products to pay lower royalties. Neither TCL nor Unwired Planet provide
guidance on this issue.48

40 Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co., [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711, [76]–[78]
(Eng.), aff’d, [2018] EWCA (Civ) 2344.
41 Id. at [1].
42 Id. at [4].
43 Id. at [475]–[80], [582]–[626].
44 Id. at [481] (Huawei asserting that “pursuant to the non-discrimination limb of FRAND
Unwired Planet are obliged to offer the same or similar rates to Huawei as they have extended to
Samsung”).
45 Id. at [806(8)].
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 While no U.S. court has directly examined the issue of discrimination between product
lines, some decisions imply different approaches to the issue. Compare Microsoft Corp. v.
Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823, 2013 WL 2111217, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (setting
different royalties rates for Microsoft Xbox products and “all other Microsoft products”), with In
re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC, No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at *38 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013)
(advocating methodology for royalty calculation that would not result in discrimination between
end use products). Unwired Planet itself calculated different royalty rates for handsets and “RAN
infrastructure,” but these are not different end uses of the network so much as different parts of
the network potentially covered by different patents. See Unwired Planet, [2017] EWHC (Pat) at
[222].
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ORGANIZATIONAL TENSIONS

Courts are not the only institutions responsible for clarifying FRAND
obligations. Standards organizations draft the actual policies that detail FRAND
licensing commitments, and the formulation of such policies can be the subject of
extensive negotiation between members.49 In particular, FRAND commitments
need to balance the competing interests of contributors and implementers. 50
Speaking broadly, entities that primarily contribute to the intellectual property for a
standard—on which they expect to be paid royalties—may advocate for looser
FRAND standards that do not constrain their licensing demands. In contrast,
entities that primarily produce goods implementing the standard—on which
royalties need to be paid—may seek stricter FRAND policies that limit payable
royalties. The specific FRAND policy of any particular standards organization
reflects the tug-of-war between these opposing interests. 51
If historical tensions in the standard setting arena have arisen between
contributing and implementing firms, the adoption of 5G standards could also
produce strains among implementers themselves. Prior generations of technology
standards were incorporated into a limited range of goods, but 5G standards will be
embedded in goods with a large variation in functionality, value, and price.
Producers that create high-value goods may insist on stronger nondiscrimination
requirements, so as to even out their possible royalty obligations with the reduced
rates paid for different, lower-value products.52 Entities that produce such low-end
items, in contrast, may press for looser nondiscrimination obligations: allowing
some room for price discrimination could allow these latter entities to decrease
their royalty obligations to more affordable levels.53 In other words, prior
49 See generally Damien Geradin, The Meaning of “Fair and Reasonable” in the Context
of Third-Party Determination of FRAND Terms, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV., 919, 934–38 (2014)
(describing the process of formulating and negotiating the intellectual property policies of ETSI).
50 See Joshua D. Wright, SSOs, FRAND, and Antitrust: Lessons From the Economics of
Incomplete Contracts, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 791, 801 (2014) (“[Standards organizations] have
the features of a two-sided market . . . a successful SSO needs to attract members on both sides of
the platform, by striking a balance for the two sides with respect to their rules and policies.”).
51 These conflicts surfaced in the recent tussle over revisions to the IEEE patent policy.
Some companies and commentators perceived these revisions as favoring the rights of entities
that produced standard-compliant goods over the rights of patentees that had contributed
intellectual property to the standard. See Jorge L. Contreras, IEEE Amends its Patent (FRAND)
Policy, PATENTLY-O (Feb. 9, 2015), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/02/amends-patentpolicy.html (stating that the IEEE revision “highlights a rift in the standardization world
between . . . patent-centric and product-centric firms”).
52 The recent participation of automotive companies in industry groups advocating for
stricter nondiscrimination requirements may be driven by such considerations. See FAIR
STANDARDS ALL., APPLICATION-DEPENDENT SEP LICENSING 1 (Aug. 30, 2016),
http://www.fair-standards.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/FSA-Application-DependentLicensing-Paper.pdf (expressing concern that by “licensing SEPs at different royalty rates based
on the application the licensee develops, a patent owner may seek compensation for value that it
did not create”); Press Release, Fair Standards All., Daimler and Hyundai Motor Company Join
the Fair Standards Alliance (Nov. 15, 2016), http://www.fair-standards.org/2016/11/15/1263/.
53 See Layne-Farrar, supra note 16, at 833 (“[E]ven within a standard-setting context,
different users are likely to place different valuations on the same IP and hence will negotiate
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generations of telecommunications technology often saw a commonality of
interests across companies implementing the standard. This commonality will not
persist, adding to the strains within standards organizations, as companies
incorporate 5G technology into a diverse multitude of devices.
CONCLUSION
Questions of nondiscrimination are not, of course, unique to intellectual
property law. Similar inquiries arise in such varied fields as constitutional law,
telecommunications law,54 and international trade law.55 Common to all of these
fields, however, is the fundamental question of whether the parties are “similarly
situated,” such that similar or like treatment is mandated.56 Both TCL and Unwired
Planet admit that FRAND nondiscrimination inquiries also incorporate this central
question—which parties should be seen as similarly situated for purposes of
determining whether patentees can charge differential royalties. 57 Unfortunately,
however, both TCL and Unwired Planet offer limited guidance for future
challenges in the area, as both cases involved discrimination between producers of
a relatively homogenous catalog of products. Caselaw has yet to struggle with the
nondiscrimination issues that a broad inventory of products, such as those expected
to incorporate 5G connectivity, would present.

different prices. The different valuations may derive from . . . different price points served—
basic, low-end devices versus high-end, full-feature devices, for example.”); see also Sidak, supra
note 13, at 360 (discussing different interests of high- and low-value manufacturers).
54 The Telecommunications Act of 1996, for example, provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful
for any common carrier to make any unjust or unreasonable discrimination.” 47 U.S.C. § 202(a)
(2012); see also Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
55 PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE & DENISE PRÉVOST, ESSENTIALS OF WTO TRADE LAW 13
(2016) (“The prohibition of discrimination is a key concept in WTO law and is often the subject
of trade disputes between WTO Members.”).
56 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (describing the
Equal Protection Clause as “essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be
treated alike”); Orloff v. FCC, 352 F.3d 415, 420 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (a telecommunications
common carrier can justify different treatment of customers by showing that such differences are
“reasonable”); BOSSCHE & PRÉVOST, supra note 55, at 20 (“Determining whether products are
‘like’” for purposes of international trade law “is often a difficult and controversial exercise.”).
57 TCL Commun. Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, No. SACV
14-341, 2017 WL 6611635, at *29 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017) (“The parties agree that like, or
close to, like rates must be offered to firms which are similarly situated.”); see also Unwired
Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co., [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711, [488] (Eng.), aff’d, [2018]
EWCA (Civ) 2344 (finding that both “Samsung and Huawei are ‘similarly situated’ on any
view”).

